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In preference-based argumentation theory, an argument may be preferred to another one when, for example, it is more
speciﬁc, its beliefs have a higher probability or certainty, or it promotes a higher value. In this paper we generalize Bench-
Capon’s value-based argumentation theory such that arguments can promote multiple values, and preferences among
values or arguments can be speciﬁed in various ways. We assume in addition that there is default knowledge about the
preferences over the arguments, and we use an algorithm to derive the most likely preference order. In particular, we show
how to use non-monotonic preference reasoning to compute preferences among arguments, and subsequently the accept-
able arguments, from preferences among values. We show also how the preference ordering can be used to optimize the
algorithm to construct the grounded extension by proceeding from most to least preferred arguments.
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Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation [14] is based only on a set and a binary relation deﬁned over the
set. Due to this abstract representation, it can and has been used in several ways, for example as a general
framework for non-monotonic reasoning, as a framework for argumentation, and as a component in agent
communication, dialogue, or decision making. Dung called the elements of his set arguments and elements
of his relation represent that an argument attacks another argument. In this paper we follow the common con-
vention in preference-based argumentation (see below) and say that in the abstract theory an argument defeats
another argument.0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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how to compute these preferences. Prakken and Sartor [20], among others [22], consider arguments composed
of defeasible rules, and use the argument structure to compute preference relations among arguments, since
being more speciﬁc about the evidence makes an argument stronger. Alternatively, several authors [9,2,1] build
arguments from beliefs pervaded with explicit priorities, such as certainty levels. The arguments using more
certain beliefs are stronger than arguments using less certain beliefs. Other authors argued that arguments
can also be related to values they promote [19,12]. In particular Bench-Capon [5] does not consider the struc-
ture of arguments, but derives a preference ordering over arguments from a preference ordering over the val-
ues they promote. Since in his theory arguments promote only a single value, an argument is preferred to
another one if and only if the value promoted by the former argument is preferred to the value promoted
by the latter one.
In this paper we introduce a generalization of Bench-Capon’s value-based argumentation theory [5] in
which arguments can promote multiple values and preferences among values or arguments can be represented
in various ways. Moreover we assume in addition that we have default knowledge about the preferences over
the arguments, and use algorithms to derive the most likely preference order.
In particular, we represent preferences among values by distinguishing various kinds of preferences in the
preference speciﬁcation, and to reason about ordered values we use insights from the non-monotonic logic of
preferences. When value v1 is promoted by the arguments A1; . . . ;An, and value v2 is promoted by arguments
B1; . . . ;Bm, then ‘‘value v1 is preferred to value v2’’ means that the set of arguments A1; . . . ;An is preferred to
the set of arguments B1; . . . ;Bm. In other words, the problem of reducing ordered values to a preference rela-
tion among arguments comes down to reducing a preference relation over sets of arguments to a preference
relation over single arguments. We use both minimal and maximal speciﬁcity principles to deﬁne the prefer-
ence relation. To calculate the acceptable arguments we combine algorithms for reasoning about preferences
with algorithms developed in argumentation theory.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the work on abstract argumentation, pref-
erence and value as far as relevant for this paper, and in Section 3 we present our extensions to Bench-Capon’s
value-based argumentation framework. In Section 4 we discuss non-monotonic reasoning with the prefer-
ences, we introduce algorithms for directly computing the set of acceptable arguments using grounded seman-
tics, and we show how the algorithm can be optimized when proceeding from most to least preferred
arguments. We present also an algorithm for ordering the arguments following a pessimistic way of reasoning.
In Section 5 we discuss the case of inconsistent preferences over values in our approach. Finally we discuss
related work and conclude.
2. Argument, preference and value
In this section we summarize the work on abstract argumentation, preference and value as far as rel-
evant for this paper. We start with some common deﬁnitions on preference relations. Let  (respectively
) be a binary relation on a ﬁnite set X ¼ fx; y; z; . . .g such that x  y (respectively x  y) means that x is
at least as preferred as (respectively strictly preferred to) y. x ’ y means that both x  y and y  x hold,
i.e. x and y are equally preferred. Lastly x  y means that neither x  y nor y  x holds, i.e. x and y are
incomparable.  is a pre-order on X iﬀ  is reﬂexive (x  x) and transitive (if x  y and y  z then
x  z). A pre-order  on X is said to be total if and only if all pairs are comparable i.e. 8x; y 2 X,
we have x  y or y  x. A strict order  may be deﬁned from a pre-order  as x  y if x  y holds
but y  x does not.
The set of the best (respectively worst) elements of A with respect to  , denoted maxðA;Þ (respectively
minðA;Þ), is deﬁned by:maxðX;Þ ¼ fxjx 2 X; 9= y 2 X; y  xg
ðrespectively minðX;Þ ¼ fxjx 2 X; 9= y 2 X; x  ygÞwhere  is the strict order associated to  .
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ordered partition ofX. This equivalent representation as an ordered partition makes some deﬁnitions easier to
read.
Deﬁnition 1 (Ordered partition). A sequence of subsets of X of the form ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ is an ordered partition of
X if and only if each subset is non-empty, Ei 6¼ ; for i ¼ 0 . . . n, the union of the subsets is the set X,
E0 [    [ En ¼ X, and the subsets are disjoint, Ei \ Ej ¼ ; for i 6¼ j.
An ordered partition ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ of X is associated with total pre-order  on X if and only if
8x; x0 2 X with x 2 Ei and x0 2 Ej we have i 6 j if and only if x  x02.1. Dung’s abstract argumentation framework
Argumentation is a reasoning model based on constructing arguments, determining potential conﬂicts
between arguments and determining acceptable arguments.
Dung’s framework [14] is based on a binary defeat relation among arguments (called the attack relation by
Dung). In Dung’s framework, an argument is an abstract entity whose role is determined only by its relation
to other arguments. Its structure and its origin are not known.
We restrict ourselves to ﬁnite argumentation frameworks, i.e., in which the set of arguments A is ﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 2 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework is a tuple hA;Di where A is a ﬁnite
set of arguments and D is a binary defeat relation deﬁned on AA.
The various semantics of an argumentation framework are all based on the notion of defence. A set of argu-
ments S defends an argument A when for each defeater B of A, there is an argument in S that defeats B.
Deﬁnition 3 (Defence). Let hA;Di be an argumentation framework. Let S A. S defends A if 8B 2A
such that B D A, 9C 2 S such that C D B.
A semantics of an argumentation theory consists of a conﬂict-free set of arguments, i.e., a set of arguments
that does not contain an argument defeating another argument in the set.
Deﬁnition 4 (Conflict-free). Let hA;Di be an argumentation framework. The setS A is conﬂict-free if and
only if there are no A;B 2 S such that ADB.
The following deﬁnition summarizes the most widely used acceptability semantics of arguments given in the
literature.
Deﬁnition 5 (Acceptability semantics). Let F ¼ hA;Di be an argumentation framework. Let S A.
• S is an admissible extension if and only if it is conﬂict-free and defends all its elements.
• S is a complete extension if and only if it is conﬂict-free and it contains precisely all the elements it defends,
S ¼ fA jS defends Ag.
• S is a grounded extension ofF if and only ifS is the smallest (for set inclusion) complete extension ofF.
• S is apreferred extensionofF if andonly ifS ismaximal (for set inclusion) amongadmissible extensionsofF.
• S is a stable extension of F if and only if S is conﬂict-free and defeats all arguments of A nS.Which semantics is most appropriate in which circumstances depends on the application domain of the
argumentation theory. The grounded semantics is the most basic one, in the sense that its conclusions are
not controversial, each argumentation framework has a grounded extension (it may be the empty set), and
this extension is unique. Grounded extensions therefore play an important role in the remainder of this paper.
Preferred semantics is more credulous than the grounded semantics. There always exists at least one preferred
extension but it does not have to be unique. Stable semantics have an intuitive appeal, but its drawbacks are
that extensions do not have to be unique and do not have to exist. Stable semantics are used, for example, in
answer set programming.
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ability semantics.2.2. Preference-based argumentation framework
Preference-based argumentation theory can either be seen as an extension or as an instantiation of Dung’s
argumentation theory. In the former case there is besides the binary defeat relation also a preference ordering
on the arguments, and the defeat and preference relation together are used to deﬁne new notions of acceptable
arguments. In the latter case there is another binary relation – typically called the attack relation in preference-
based argumentation – and a preference ordering from which Dung’s defeat relation is derived. For example,
Amgoud and Cayrol [1] deﬁne a preference relation on the set of arguments on the basis of the evaluation of
arguments, and say that an argument A defeats an argument B if and only if A attacks B and B is not preferred
to A with respect to the preference relation. In this paper we follow the latter approach.
Deﬁnition 6 (Preference-based argumentation framework). A preference-based argumentation framework is a
triplet hA;R;i where A is a set of arguments, R is a binary attack relation deﬁned on AA and  is a
(total or partial) pre-order (preference relation) deﬁned on AA.
A preference-based argumentation framework can represent an argumentation framework.
Deﬁnition 7. A preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i represents hA;Di if and only if
8A;B 2A; we have ADB if and only if ARB and it is not the case that B  AThere are always preference-based argumentation frameworks representing an argumentation framework
and vice versa.
Lemma 1. For each preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i there is an argumentation framework
hA;Di it represents, and for each argumentation framework hA;Di there is a preference-based argumentation
framework hA;R;i that represents it.
All proofs are given in the Appendix.
On the one hand each preference-based argumentation framework represents only one argumentation
framework, but on the other hand each argumentation framework can be represented by various prefer-
ence-based argumentation frameworks.
Lemma 2. If preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i represents argumentation framework
hA;D1i and argumentation framework hA;D2i, then we have D1 ¼ D2.
Note however that if both hA;R1;1i and hA;R2;2i represent hA;Di, then we do not necessarily have
that R1 ¼ R2 and 1 ¼ 2. Let hA;Di be an argumentation framework such thatA ¼ fA;Bg and ADB. Let
hA;R1;1i and hA;R2;2i with AR1B, A’1B, AR2B, BR2A and A2B. Both hA;R1;1i and hA;R2;2i
represent hA;Di.
Summarizing, each preference-based argumentation framework represents precisely one argumentation
framework, and each argumentation framework is represented by at least one but usually several prefer-
ence-based argumentation frameworks.
Theorem 1. For each preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i there is precisely one argumentation
framework hA;Di it represents, and for each argumentation framework hA;Di there is at least one preference-
based argumentation framework hA;R;i that represents it.
The following example illustrates how to compute an argumentation framework that represents a prefer-
ence-based argumentation framework. We use this example as a running example in this paper, and extend
it later on with values and value speciﬁcations.
Example 1. Let hA;R;i be a preference-based argumentation framework visualized in Fig. 1 with
A ¼ fA0; . . . ;A7g be a set of arguments, read as follows:
734 S. Kaci, L. van der Torre / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 730–751A0: ‘‘The soccer game is going to be very interesting, many people will watch the game because it is Bar-
celona against Arsenal,’’
A1: ‘‘One should not always do the same as ones friends, but also develop an idea oneself what is good
to do,’’
A2: ‘‘I have to watch the game, because Barcelona has not been in the ﬁnal for six years,’’
A3: ‘‘You better not watch the game, you have an exam tomorrow and you have to prepare it,’’
A4: ‘‘I have to watch the game, because I want to discuss it tomorrow with my friends,’’
A5: ‘‘You are not going to watch television tonight, because you have been looking television for three eve-
nings in a row, and television is unhealthy, dumb and uninspiring,’’
A6: ‘‘The soccer game is going to be boring, because the ﬁrst half was already won by 6-0,’’
A7: ‘‘Children must go to school. Education is important because it gives more options later on.’’
Moreover, let  be a total pre-order deﬁned as follows:Fig. 1.
A0DA6A0 ’ A3  A1 ’ A2 ’ A4 ’ A5  A6 ’ A7
and let R be an attack relation deﬁned by: A0 and A6 attack each other, A2 and A3 attack each other, A2 and A5
attack each other, A3 and A4 attack each other, A4 and A5 attack each other. The preference-based argumen-
tation framework is visualized in Fig. 1. This ﬁgure should be read as follows. An arrow from one argument to
another visualizes that the former argument attacks the latter one.
An argument is preferred to another argument if the former argument is higher than the latter one.
Assume that hA;R;i represents hA;Di, then we have A0DA6, because A0RA6 and A6  A0 does not hold.
Similarly we have A3DA2, A2DA5, A5DA2, A3DA4, A4DA5 and A5DA4, and no other defeat relations hold.
The semantics of a preference-based argumentation framework is simply the semantics of the unique argu-
mentation framework it represents. Due to the representation, we do not need to deﬁne new semantic notions.
Deﬁnition 8. A set of arguments is an admissible, grounded, preferred, or stable extension of a preference-
based argumentation framework hA;R;i if it is such an extension of the argumentation framework hA;Di
represented by hA;R;i.
The semantics is illustrated in our running example.
Example 2 (Continued from Example 1). The grounded extension of argumentation framework hA;Di and
therefore of preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i is GE ¼ fA0;A1;A3;A5;A7g.
2.3. Value-based argumentation framework
Bench-Capon [5] notices that in some situations, e.g., for persuasion dialogues, preferences over arguments
are derived from points of views, called values, they promote. Atkinson et al. [4] discuss an example from polit-
ical debate, where several arguments to invade Iraq are related to values such as respect for life, human rights,
good world relations, and so on. If an argument promoting respect for life attacks an argument promoting good
world relations then the attack succeeds only if good world relations is not preferred to respect for life.
Bench-Capon’s value-based argumentation framework allows to compare abstract arguments without
referring to their internal structure, which is an advantage if such information is not available. A set ofExample 1: An arrow visualizes an attack, and higher arguments are preferred to lower ones. The represented defeat relation is:
, A3DA2, A2DA5, A5DA2, A3DA4, A4DA5 and A5DA4. The grounded extension is GE ¼ fA0;A1;A3;A5;A7g.
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values.
Deﬁnition 9 [5]. A value-based argumentation framework is a 5-tuple VAF ¼ hA;R; V ; val;Pi, whereA is a
ﬁnite set of arguments,R is an irreﬂexive binary relation onA, V is a non-empty set of values, val is a function
which maps elements of A to elements of V and P is the set of possible audiences. An audience speciﬁc
argumentation framework is a tuple VAFa ¼ hA;R; V ; val; >ai, where a 2 P is an audience and >a is a partial
order on V.
Whereas Bench-Capon is primarily interested in the notion of value-based argumentation framework, in
this paper we consider only the notion of audience speciﬁc argumentation frameworks.
Deﬁnition 10. hA;R; V ; val; >ai represents hA;R;i if and only if (8A;B 2A, we have A  B if and only if
valðAÞ>avalðBÞ or valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ).
Concerning existence of audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks representing a prefer-
ence-based argumentation framework, the situation is the same as between preference-based argumentation
frameworks and argumentation frameworks. So there exist audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation
frameworks representing each preference-based argumentation framework and vice versa.
Lemma 3. For each audience specific value-based argumentation framework hA;R; V ; val; >ai there is a
preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i it represents, and for each preference-based argumentation
framework hA;R;i there is an audience specific value-based argumentation framework hA;R; V ; val; >ai that
represents it.
On the one hand each audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework represents only one prefer-
ence-based argumentation framework, but on the other hand each preference-based argumentation frame-
work can be represented by various audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks. However,
each of these audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks has the same topology, that is, each
of them is a renaming of the others.
Lemma 4. If hA;R; V ; val; >ai represents hA;R;1i and hA;R;2i, then 1 ¼ 2. If both
hA;R; V 1; val1; >a;1i and hA;R; V 2; val2; >a;2i represent hA;R;i, then we have:
(1) for all A;B 2A we have val1ðAÞ ¼ val1ðBÞ if and only if we have val2ðAÞ ¼ val2ðBÞ
(2) for all A;B 2A we have val1ðAÞ>a;1val1ðBÞ if and only if we have val2ðAÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ.Summarizing, each audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework represents precisely one pref-
erence-based argumentation framework, and each preference-based argumentation framework is represented
by an equivalence class of alphabetic variants of audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks.
Theorem 2. For each audience specific value-based argumentation framework hA;R; V ; val; >ai there is precisely
one preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i it represents, and for each preference-based
argumentation framework hA;R;i there is a set of audience specific value-based argumentation frameworks
hA;R; V ; val; >ai that represents it, satisfying the property in Lemma 4.
The relation between the three kinds of argumentation frameworks shown in Theorems 1 and 2 is visualized
in Fig. 2. An argumentation framework can be represented by various preference-based argumentation frame-
works, which can again be represented by various audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks.
Given an audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework, there is a unique preference-based argu-
mentation framework it represents, and a unique argumentation framework it represents.
The semantics of an audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework is again simply the semantics
of the unique preference-based argumentation framework it represents.
Deﬁnition 11. A set of arguments is an admissible, grounded, preferred or stable extension of an audience
speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework hA;R; V ; val; >ai if it is such an extension of the preference-
based argumentation framework hA;R;i represented by hA;R; V ; val; >ai.
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of representation relations.
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the sense that two arguments promoting the same value may conﬂict.
Example 3 (Continued from Example 2). Let hA;R; V ; val; >ai be a value-based argumentation theory withA
and R as before, and V ¼ fred; yellow; blueg, valðA0Þ ¼ valðA3Þ ¼ red, valðA1Þ ¼ valðA2Þ ¼ valðA5Þ ¼
valðA4Þ ¼ yellow and valðA6Þ ¼ valðA7Þ ¼ blue, and red>ayellow>ablue. We leave it to the reader that this
value-based argumentation theory is represented by the preference-based argumentation theory hA;R;i in
Example 1.
The grounded extension of hA;R; V ; val; >ai is the grounded extension of hA;R;i and therefore, as
shown in Example 2, GE ¼ fA0;A1;A3;A5;A7g.
Moreover, Bench-Capon deﬁnes the notions of objective acceptance for all possible audiences and subjec-
tive acceptance for a particular audience. The main insight from the theory is that some arguments can be
objectively acceptable regardless of the preference ordering of the audiences, simply due to the structure of
the values. These cases are formally characterized in [5].
2.4. Total pre-orders
In this paper we are in particular interested in preference-based argumentation frameworks in which the
preference relation is a total pre-order, i.e., in which the preference relation is connected. In such a case it
immediately follows from Deﬁnition 7 that we have A D B if and only if A R B and A  B. At a given stage
of the reasoning, >a may be expressed as a partial order, since it is not necessary to commit to all preferences.
However, if arguments need to be compared, >a must be a total order in the sense that commitment must be
made, the audience becomes more speciﬁc. A total order on values corresponds directly to a total pre-order on
arguments, since an argument is preferred to another one if the value promoted by the former is preferred to
the value promoted by the latter argument, and the two arguments are equally preferred if they promote the
same value.
A natural question to ask now is what happens with the representation results in Theorems 1 and 2 as visu-
alized in Fig. 2 when we consider total pre-orders only. For example, elsewhere we have shown that the the-
orems no longer hold when we consider only symmetric attack relations [16] (The attack relation is symmetric
in the running example, but obviously this is not necessarily always the case). The question can thus be raised
whether the same consequence holds for the restriction to total pre-orders. However, the following two the-
orems show that this is not the case.
Theorem 3. For each preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i with  a total pre-order there is
precisely one argumentation framework hA;Di it represents, and for each argumentation framework hA;Di
there is at least one preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i with  a total pre-order that
represents it.
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cisely one preference-based argumentation framework with  a total pre-order it represents, and for each prefer-
ence-based argumentation framework with  a total pre-order there is a set of audience specific value-based
argumentation frameworks with >a a total order that represents it, satisfying the property in Lemma 4.
Summarizing, the restriction to total pre-orders is not a limitation of the expressive power of audience spe-
ciﬁc value-based argumentation, in the sense that the same class of argumentation frameworks can be repre-
sented. Moreover, audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks as deﬁned by Bench-Capon may
be seen as an equivalent representation as preference-based argumentation frameworks, as each preference-
based argumentation framework is represented by precisely one audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation
framework (under renaming of the values). We emphasize that this property holds only for audience speciﬁc
argumentation frameworks, and there is no analogue to the general value-based argumentation frameworks
deﬁned by Bench-Capon in preference-based argumentation theory (and therefore no analogue to objective
and subjective acceptance).
3. A new value-based argumentation theory and value speciﬁcation
We introduce two extensions for value-based argumentation: arguments promoting multiple values, and
various kinds of preferences among values.
3.1. Arguments promoting multiple values
To represent that arguments can promote multiple values, we replace the val function in Deﬁnition 9 by the
arg function in Deﬁnition 12 below.
Deﬁnition 12 (Value-based argumentation framework). An audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation
framework in which arguments can promote multiple values is a 5-tuple hA;R; V ; arg; >ai where A is a
set of arguments, R is an attack relation onAA, V is a set of values, arg is a function from V to 2A such
that argðvÞ is the set of arguments promoting the value v, and >a is a partial order on V.
Note that, in contrast to Bench-Capon’s framework, it may be the case that an argument does not promote
any value.
The following example illustrates that we can no longer say that an argument A defeats an argument B if
and only if argument A attacks argument B and the value promoted by argument B is not preferred to the
value promoted by argument A, as follows from Deﬁnitions 7 and 10, since there may be several values pro-
moted by argument A and B.
Example 4. We ﬁrst consider an example of Bench-Capon [5] where each argument promotes exactly one
value. Let A ¼ fA;B;Cg, V ¼ fred; blueg with valðAÞ ¼ red and valðBÞ ¼ valðCÞ ¼ blue. In our value-based
argumentation framework, we have argðredÞ ¼ fAg and argðblueÞ ¼ fB;Cg. Let ARB and BRC, as visualized
in Fig. 3a and b. If red > blue, then ADB and BDC and the grounded extension is fA;Cg. If blue > red, as
visualized in Fig. 3b, then BDC and the grounded extension is fA;Bg. Note that A is always in the groundedFig. 3. Example 4.
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not consider cases in which values are incomparable or equally preferred.
Now consider the case in which argðredÞ ¼ fA;Bg, and moreover that argument B attacks argument A, as
visualized in Fig. 3c and d, such that argument B promotes both values. Do we have that argument A is in all
grounded extensions? Then the question is how to deﬁne the defeat relation since argument B promotes both
red and blue. Should we give a preference to argument B since its promotes both values while argument A
promotes only one value?
The problem is that the ordering on values is now an ordering on sets of arguments. There are many ad hoc
solutions to the problem, such as taking the preferred value promoted by an argument. Before we consider our
solution to this problem, we ﬁrst consider another generalization of Bench-Capon’s theory.
3.2. Preference speciﬁcation
Since most languages for preferences and non-monotonic reasoning algorithms are based on total pre-
orders, from here on we restrict ourselves to total pre-orders. As shown in Theorems 3 and 4, this does not
restrict the expressive power of preference-based argumentation in the sense that still all argumentation frame-
works can be represented. Instead of a partial order > on values we use a relation  which is neither neces-
sarily transitive nor irreﬂexive. We therefore call it a preference speciﬁcation rather than a preference relation.
 is to be seen as a set of preference statements of the kind v1  v2 for value v1 is preferred to value v2. In
Bench-Capon’s framework, a preference of a value v1 over a value v2 implicitly means that each argument pro-
moting v1 is preferred to each argument promoting v2. However, this is not the only way to compare argu-
ments promoting v1 and arguments promoting v2. For example, an agent may be satisﬁed if at least one
argument promoting human rights is preferred to all arguments promoting good world relations, or if at least
one argument promoting respect for life is preferred to at least one argument promoting good world relations.
The following deﬁnition presents three kinds of preference discussed in the literature [17,8,10,7].
Deﬁnition 13 (Preference types). Let hA;R;i be a preference-based argumentation framework, V a set of
values, arg a function from values to sets of arguments, and v1 and v2 two values.
•  satisﬁes v1 mM v2, v1 is minmax preferred to v2, if and only if 8A 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ, 8B 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ
we have A  B.
•  satisﬁes v1 MM v2, v1 is maxmax preferred to v2, if and only if 8A 2 maxðargðv1Þ;Þ, 8B 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ
we have A  B.
•  satisﬁes v1 mm v2, v1 is minmin preferred to v2, if and only if 8A 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ, 8B 2 minðargðv2Þ;Þ
we have A  B.Deﬁnition 14 (Preference consistency). A set of preferences  is consistent only if there is a total pre-order 
which satisﬁes each vi x vj in, with x 2 fmM ;MM ;mmg.  is a model of if and only if  satisﬁes each
vi x vj in .
In natural language, the above preferences are interpreted as follows:
•  satisﬁes v1 mM v2 if and only if each argument in v1 is preferred to each argument in v2 with respect to  ,
•  satisﬁes v1 MM v2 if and only if at least one argument in v1 is preferred to each argument in v2 with
respect to  ,
•  satisﬁes v1 mm v2 if and only if each argument in v1 is preferred to at least one argument in v2 with
respect to  .
We do not consider maxmin preferences of the form v1 Mm v2, deﬁned in the obvious way, since we are
interested in distinguished total pre-orders on A according to the speciﬁcity principle (see the next section),
and thus far no extensions of the speciﬁcity principle have been proposed which cover preferences of the type
v1 Mm v2 (see [15] for a discussion).
Minmax preferences can be reduced to either only maxmax or only minmin preferences.
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we call vA. We have that  satisfies v1 mM v2 if and only if for each A 2 argðv1Þ (A 2 argðv2Þ),  satisfies
vA MM v2 (v1 mm vA).
 is interpreted as a compact speciﬁcation of  , and we therefore call our framework a value-speciﬁcation
argumentation framework. Since minmax preferences can be reduced into either maxmax or minmin prefer-
ences, we focus on maxmax and minmin preferences. They may be interpreted as two audiences in Bench-
capon’s framework, though we do not further discuss this interpretation in this paper, because we do not
consider notions like objective and subjective acceptance.
Deﬁnition 15 (Value-specification). A value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework is a 5-tuple hA;R;
V ; arg;xi where A is a set of arguments, R is an attack relation on AA, V is a set of values, arg is a
function from V to 2A, and x  V  V is a set of preference statements over V with x 2 fMM ;mmg.
We now address the problem discussed in Example 4, that we can no longer say that an argument A defeats
an argument B if and only if A attacks B and the value promoted by B is not preferred to the value promoted
by argument A. Our framework requires to ﬁrst order the set of all arguments before we determine the defeat
relation. We construct a total pre-order on A given a set of preferences over values using the minimal/max-
imal speciﬁcity principle [23].
Deﬁnition 16 (Minimal/Maximal specificity principle). Let ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ and 0 ¼ ðE00; . . . ;E0mÞ be two total
pre-orders on A.  is less speciﬁc than or equally speciﬁc as 0, written as  v 0, if and only if 8A 2A, if
A 2 Ei and A 2 E0j then i 6 j.
 belongs to the set of the least (respectively most) speciﬁc pre-orders among a set of pre-orders O if there is
no 0 in O such that 0@  (respectively  @0), i.e., 0 v  holds but  v 0 does not (respectively  v 0
holds but 0 v  does not).
It is well known that there exists a unique least speciﬁc model for maxmax preferences and a unique most
speciﬁc model for minmin preferences [17,7]. A unique most (respectively least) speciﬁc model for the former
(respectively latter) does not necessarily exist.
We use a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework to represent a preference-based argumentation
framework rather than a value-based argumentation framework, because of the close relationship between
preference-based and value-based argumentation as shown in Theorems 2 and 4. Note that the following def-
inition consists of two steps. First we deﬁne when a preference-based argumentation framework satisﬁes a
value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework. Second, for a value-based argumentation framework, we deﬁne
the represented preference-based argumentation framework as the most speciﬁc one among the ones that sat-
isfy the value-based argumentation framework.
Deﬁnition 17. hA;R;i satisﬁes hA;R; V ; arg;xi if and only if  satisﬁes each vi x vj in x.
hA;R; V ; arg;xi represents hA;R;i if and only if x ¼ MM (x ¼ mm) and  is the least (most) speciﬁc
relation among the 0 such that hA;R;0i satisﬁes hA;R; V ; arg;xi.
Concerning existence of value-speciﬁcation argumentation frameworks representing a preference-based
argumentation framework, the situation is diﬀerent from before. There exist value-speciﬁcation argumentation
frameworks representing each preference-based argumentation framework, but not necessarily vice versa.
Lemma 6. For each preference-based argumentation framework there is a value-specification argumentation
framework that represents it.
There are value-speciﬁcation argumentation frameworks without a preference-based argumentation frame-
work it represents. Any value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework with an inconsistent set of preferences
cannot be represented by a preference-based argumentation framework.
As before, on the one hand each value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework represents at most one pref-
erence-based argumentation framework, but on the other hand each preference-based argumentation frame-
work can be represented by various value-speciﬁcation argumentation frameworks.
Lemma 7. If hA;R; V ; arg;xi represents hA;R;1i and hA;R;2i, then we have 1 ¼ 2.
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essarily have that the property of Lemma 4 holds. Consider the set of preferences ffA;Bg MM fCgg and the
set of preferences ffAg MM fCg; fBg MM fCgg. They have the same minimal model, and therefore they rep-
resent the same preference-based argumentation theory.
Summarizing, each value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework represents at most one preference-based
argumentation framework, whereas each preference-based argumentation framework is represented by at least
one but usually several value-speciﬁcation argumentation frameworks. These value-speciﬁcation argumenta-
tion frameworks are not necessarily renamings of each other.
Theorem 5. For each value-specification argumentation framework there is at most one preference-based
argumentation framework it represents, and for each preference-based argumentation framework there is at least
one value-specification argumentation framework that represents it.
In other words, the hierarchy of representation relations in Fig. 2 also holds for value speciﬁcation.
Example 5 (Continued from Example 3). Let the tuple hA;R; V ; arg;xi be a value-speciﬁcation argumen-
tation framework deﬁned by the set of argumentsA ¼ fA0;A1;A2;A3;A4;A5;A6;A7g, and the attack relationR
given in Example 1, V ¼ fv1; v2; v3; v4; v5; v6g ¼ fhealth; short term pleasure; education; enjoy; social; aloneg
with argðv1Þ ¼ fA5g, argðv2Þ ¼ fA6;A7g, argðv3Þ ¼ fA3;A7g, argðv4Þ ¼ fA2;A4g, argðv5Þ ¼ fA0;A4g,
argðv6Þ ¼ fA1;A5g, and MM ¼ fv1 MM v2; v3 MM v4; v5 MM v6g.
Let  be a total pre-order on A deﬁned by
A0 ’ A3  A1 ’ A2 ’ A4 ’ A5  A6 ’ A7We can check that  satisﬁes each preference inMM. Then hA;R;i satisﬁes hA;R; V ; arg;MMi. We can
also check that  is the least speciﬁc relation among 0 such that hA;R;0i satisﬁes hA;R; V ; arg;MMi so
hA;R; V ; arg;MMi represents hA;R;i.
Note that a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework that represents a preference-based argumentation
framework exists only if x is consistent.
The semantics of a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework is simply the semantics of the unique pref-
erence-based argumentation framework it represents, if such a framework exists. Otherwise its semantics is
discussed in Section 5.
Deﬁnition 18. A set of arguments is an admissible, grounded, preferred or stable extension of a value-
speciﬁcation argumentation framework hA;R; V ; arg;xi if it is such an extension of the preference-based
argumentation framework represented by hA;R; V ; arg;xi.
The new theory is illustrated in the following section using new algorithms for the framework.
4. Algorithms
We can compute the grounded extension of a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework in the following
two steps. Given a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework, in the ﬁrst step we compute the preference-
based argumentation framework it represents using algorithms for minimal and maximal speciﬁcity developed
in non-monotonic logic (Deﬁnition 17). Since the existence of a preference-based argumentation framework
that is represented by a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework requires the consistency ofx, we sup-
pose that x is consistent. We discuss the case of inconsistent x in Section 5.
Given the preference-based argumentation framework, in the second step we compute the represented argu-
mentation framework using Deﬁnition 7. Finally we can compute the grounded extension of the argumenta-
tion framework. In the remainder of this paper we study whether this process can be optimized.
Let us analyze how least and most speciﬁc models are computed. Let v1 x v2. The least speciﬁc model
associated with fv1 MM v2g is ¼ ðE1;E2Þ with E1 ¼A n argðv2Þ and E2 ¼ argðv2Þ. The most speciﬁc model
associated with fv1 mm v2g is 0 ¼ ðE01;E02Þ with E01 ¼ argðv1Þ and E02 ¼A n argðv1Þ. Both models prefer
argðv1Þ over argðv2Þ. However they treat irrelevant arguments with respect to these preferences, i.e.
A n ðargðv1Þ [ argðv2ÞÞ, in an opposite way. The least speciﬁc model prefers such arguments to argðv2Þ; this
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in the same level as preferred arguments, i.e. argðv1Þ, so they are put in the same level as argðv2Þ; this is a pes-
simistic way of reasoning.
In general, given a set of preferences, in the least speciﬁc model each argument is put in the highest possible
rank while in the most speciﬁc model each argument is put in the lowest possible rank in the pre-order. It is
worth noticing that optimistic and pessimistic adjectives refer to the way the total pre-orders are computed
and by no way mean that the most speciﬁc pre-order (corresponding to a pessimistic reasoning) gives less out-
put than the least speciﬁc pre-order (corresponding to an optimistic reasoning). This is shown in the following
example.
Example 6. Let A ¼ fA;B;Cg, V ¼ fv1; v2; v3g with argðv1Þ ¼ fAg, argðv2Þ ¼ fBg and argðv3Þ ¼ fCg. Let
CRB and BRC. Let v1 x v2. Following the optimistic reasoning the least speciﬁc pre-order satisfying
fv1 MM v2g is ¼ ðfA;Cg; fBgÞ, as visualized in Fig. 4a. We can check that each argument is put in the
highest possible rank in  such that v1 MM v2 is satisﬁed. So we have CDB. The grounded extension is
fA;Cg. Now following the pessimistic reasoning the most speciﬁc pre-order satisfying fv1 mm v2g is
0 ¼ ðfAg; fB;CgÞ, as visualized in Fig. 4b. Here also we can check that each argument is put in the lowest
possible rank in 0 such that v1 mm v2 is satisﬁed. In this case we have BDC and CDB. The grounded
extension is fAg.
In addition to the above attack relations we give ARC and CRA. The optimistic reasoning gives an empty
grounded extension, as visualized in Fig. 4c, while the pessimistic reasoning gives fA;Bg, as visualized in
Fig. 4d.
Let us now consider the following attack relations ARC and CRA only. Then the grounded extension
following the optimistic reasoning is fBg, as visualized in Fig. 4e, while the grounded extension following the
pessimistic reasoning is fA;Bg, as visualized in Fig. 4f.
Thus, the two kinds of reasonings are incomparable, in the sense that in some cases optimistic reasoning
gives a larger grounded extension, in other cases it gives a smaller extension.4.1. Grounded extension in optimistic reasoning
Algorithms of optimistic reasoning obey System Z [17] and compute the total pre-order  starting from the
best arguments with respect to  . This is a very nice property as it allows to compute incrementally the
grounded extension during the computation of this pre-order. Let ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ. We ﬁrst compute E0. Then
some arguments of E0 will belong to the grounded extension and the remaining arguments of E0 will not.
Lemma 8. Let GE be the grounded extension of hA;R; V ; arg;MM i, and let ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ be the least
specific model of MM.
(1) 8A 2 E0 if 9=B 2 E0 such that BRA then A 2 GE.
(2) Let S1 be a subset of GE. 8A 2 E0, if 9B 2 E0 such that BRA and A is defended by S1 then A 2 GE.
(3) Let S2  GE be the minimal subset of E0 satisfying the conditions in items 1 and 2. Then 8A 2 E0 n S2,
A 62 GE.Fig. 4. Example 6.
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of E0 which are attacked only by arguments fromA n E0. Such attacks do not succeed since the attackers are
strictly less preferred than the attacked arguments, that is, these attackers are not defeaters in the represented
argumentation theory. S1 corresponds to SafeðE0Þ in Algorithm 1; R ¼ ; for E0. It is computed in line 4.
Item 2 requires that GE contains elements of E0 that are attacked by elements of E0 but defended by accept-
able arguments of E0, those already put in GE following item 1. This is done in loop 6 where AcceptableGEðE0Þ
computes the set of arguments of E0 defended by acceptable arguments; R ¼ ; for E0.
Finally, item 3 states that arguments of E0 which are defeated and not defended do not belong to GE and
can be removed from A. This is treated in line 7 of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 9 states that arguments of A n E0 attacked by arguments of GE do not belong to the grounded
extension. This is treated in line 8.
Lemma 9. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MM i be a value-specification argumentation framework and GE be its grounded
extension. Let ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ be the least specific model of MM. Then,8A 2A n E0; if 9B 2 GE such that BRA then A 62 GEFollowing Pearl’s algorithm [17], onceA updated we remove satisﬁed preferences. v1 MM v2 is satisﬁed if
at least one argument in argðv1Þ belongs to E0. This is treated in line 9.
The next step is to compute the set of immediately preferred arguments in  , i.e., E1. We repeat the same
steps as for E0. The only diﬀerence is that the set R may be non-empty. In the ﬁrst loop of the algorithm (after
computing E0 in line 2), R is composed of arguments of E0 which do not belong to GE. Suppose now that
we computed E1 and are looking to which arguments of E1 will belong to GE. Since SafeðE1Þ is the set of
arguments of E1 which are not defeated, we should check whether some arguments of E0 attack arguments
of E1. If it is the case, then AcceptableGEðE1Þ determines which arguments of E1 are defended by the current
grounded extension. R is computed in line 10 of the algorithm. The role of R is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 7. LetA ¼ fA;B;C;Dg and v1 MM v2 with argðv1Þ ¼ fA;B;Cg and argðv2Þ ¼ fDg. Let BRC, CRB
and BRD. We have E0 ¼ fA;B;Cg. A belongs to the grounded extension while B and C do not (since they
defeat each other). Following the algorithm we update A and get A ¼ fDg. At this stage it is important to
keep B and C in a set, let’s say R. The reason is that in the second iteration of the algorithm we should not put
D in the grounded extension just because it is not defeated by A. In fact D is defeated by B and not defended
by A. This justiﬁes why we consider El [ R when computing SafeðElÞ and AcceptableGEðElÞ.
The above reasoning is repeated until the set of arguments is empty.
Lemma 10. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MMi be a value-specification argumentation framework and GE be its grounded
extension.
For each Ek, (k 6¼ 0):
Let A be the set of arguments after iteration k 	 1 and R ¼ ðE0 [    [ Ek	1Þ n GE. Then,
• 8A 2 Ek, if 9=B 2 ðEk [ RÞ such that BRA then A 2 GE.
• Let S1 be a subset of GE. 8A 2 Ek, if 9B 2 ðEk [ RÞ such that BRA and A is defended by S1 then A 2 GE.
• Let S2  GE be the minimal subset of Ek computed following items 1 and 2. Then 8A 2 Ek n S2, A 62 GE.
• 8A 2A n Ek, if 9B 2 GE such that BRA then A 62 GE.Algorithm 1 gives a formal description of our procedure to compute progressively the grounded extension.
If we ignore items 4, 5 (except B ¼ El), 6, 8 and 10 in Algorithm 1, then we recover Pearl’s algorithm [17] to
compute the least speciﬁc model of MM. Let
• SafeðElÞ ¼ fB : B 2 El such that 9=B0 2 ðEl [ RÞ with B0RBg,
• AcceptableGEðElÞ ¼ fB : B 2 El; for each B0 2 ðEl [ RÞ such that B0RB; 9C 2 GE such that CRB0g,
• non-SafeGEðAÞ ¼ fB : B 2A such that 9B0 2 GE with B0RBg.
Algorithm 1. Interleaved computation of the grounded extension in optimistic reasoning.Data: hA;R; V ; arg;MMi, MM ¼ fvi MM vjg.
Result: The grounded extension.
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while A 6¼ ; do
2. El ¼ fB : B 2A; 8vi MM vj;B 62 argðvjÞg
3. if El ¼ ; then
Stop (inconsistent preferences)
4. GE ¼ GE [ SafeðElÞ
5. B ¼ El, El ¼ El n SafeðElÞ, x = 1
6. while El 6¼ ; and x = 1 do
– GE ¼ GE [ AcceptableGEðElÞ
if AcceptableGEðElÞ ¼ ; then x = 0
– El ¼ El n AcceptableGEðElÞ
7. A ¼A nB,
8. A ¼A n non-SafeGEðAÞ
9. remove vi MM vj where argðviÞ \B 6¼ ;
10. R ¼ R [ ðB n GEÞ,
11. l ¼ lþ 1.
return GE
endExample 8 (Continued from Example 5). Let hA;R; V ; arg;MMi as before. We have E0 ¼ fA0;A3g. Both E0
and E3 are attacked by arguments ofA n E0 (strictly less preferred). So both belong to GE, i.e. fA0;A3g  GE
following item 1 of Lemma 8. Now A2;A4 and A6 are attacked by A0 and A3. So they do not belong to GE
following Lemma 9. Then A ¼ fA1;A5;A7g. We remove educationMM enjoy and socialMM alone since
they are satisﬁed. Now E1 ¼ fA1;A5g. A1 and A5 are not defeated so they are added to GE i.e.
fA0;A3;A1;A5g  GE. A ¼ fA7g. healthMM short term pleasure is satisﬁed; it is removed. Lastly
E2 ¼ fA7g. A7 is not attacked so it is added to GE. In sum GE ¼ fA0;A1;A3;A5;A7g.
Theorem 6. LetF ¼ hA;R; V ; arg;MMi be a value-specification argumentation framework. Algorithm 1 com-
putes the grounded extension of F.
The algorithm is an anytime algorithm, in the sense that when it is stopped in the middle of the execution, it
has built part of the grounded extension. The computation of the grounded extension following Algorithm 1 is
achieved in a polynomial time in the number of arguments and preferences inMM. So there is no extra cost
when using our approach with respect to Dung’s framework in which the computation of the grounded exten-
sion is also polynomial [13].
4.2. Grounded extension in pessimistic reasoning
In this section the argumentation framework is deﬁned by hA;R; V ; arg;mmi. A particularity of pessimis-
tic reasoning is that it computes the most speciﬁc model of mm starting from the lowest rank-ordered argu-
ments in this model. Indeed it is no longer possible to compute progressively the grounded extension. So we
have to compute the most speciﬁc model ofmm, let’s say 0, then to deﬁne defeat relations on the basis of 0
and R and lastly to compute the grounded extension. Algorithm 2 computes the most speciﬁc model ofmm.
Algorithm 2. Pessimistic reasoning – A model of mm
Data: hA;R; V ; arg;mmi, mm ¼ fvi mm vjg.
Result: The most speciﬁc model of mm.
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while A 6¼ ; do
El ¼ fB : B 2A; 8vi mm vj;B 62 argðviÞg
ifEl ¼ ; then
Stop (inconsistent preferences)
– A ¼A n El
– Remove vi mm vj where argðvjÞ \ El 6¼ ;
– l ¼ lþ 1.
return 0 ¼ ðE00; . . . ;E0l	1Þ with " 0 6 h 6 l	 1;E0h ¼ El	h	1
endExample 9 (Continued from Example 8). We have E0 ¼ fA1;A2;A6g and E1 ¼ fA0;A3;A4;A5;A7g. Indeed
0 ¼ ðfA0;A3;A4;A5;A7g; fA1;A2;A6gÞ. We have A0DA6;A3DA2;A5DA2;A3DA4;A4DA3;A4DA5 and A5DA4.
Then GE ¼ fA0;A1;A7g.
Here also the computation of the total pre-order following Algorithm 2 is achieved in a polynomial time.
Once defeat relations are computed, we know from [13] that the computation of the grounded extension is
polynomial in time.
As said before, the grounded extension in pessimistic reasoning cannot be computed progressively as in the
optimistic reasoning. Nevertheless we can ensure in some cases whether an argument will belong to GE or not.
Let us consider our running example. Following Algorithm 2, the worst arguments are A1; A2 and A6. At this
stage we can ensure that A1 belongs to GE since it is not attacked. We can also ensure that A6 does not belong to
GE since its defeater A0 is not attacked and, indeed, will belong to GE. However we cannot say anything about
A2 since its defeaters A3 and A5 are attacked by A4. At this stage the order over A3; A4 and A5 is not stated yet.
Lemma 11. Let hA;R; V ; arg;mmi be an argumentation framework and GE be its associated grounded
extension.
• If A 2 Ek such that 9=B 2A with BRA then A 2 GE.
• If A 2 Ek such that 9B 2A with BRA and 9=C 2A with CRB then A 62 GE.Note that in both optimistic and pessimistic reasonings, Algorithms 1 and 2 consider all arguments of A
when computing El. The setx is used to order arguments and to determine defeat relations later. Indeed in
our approach an argument does not necessarily promote a value. This is intuitively meaningful since it is pos-
sible to use arguments, in a persuasion dialogue for example, which their only role is to attack other arguments
without promoting any value.5. Value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework with inconsistent preferences
In the previous sections we focused on consistent preferences. The consistency of x is a necessary condi-
tion to compute a preference-based argumentation framework that is represented by the value-speciﬁcation
argumentation framework.
The consistency of a set of preferences x in our framework means that there exists a total pre-order 
satisfying each preference vi x vj in x. Otherwise x is inconsistent.
Example 10. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MMi be a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework with A ¼ fA0;A1;
A2;A3;A4;A5;A6;A7g, V ¼ fv1; v2; v3; v4; v5; v6g, argðv1Þ ¼ fA1;A3g, argðv2Þ ¼ fA6;A7g, argðv3Þ ¼ fA3;A5g,
argðv4Þ ¼ fA0;A1;A2g, argðv5Þ ¼ fA0;A1g and argðv6Þ ¼ fA3;A4;A5g. R is the attack relation given in
Example 1. Let MM ¼ fv1 MM v2; v3 MM v4; v5 MM v6g. Given MM we would like to compute a total
pre-order ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ satisfying each preference inMM. Following the minimal speciﬁcity principle E0 is
composed of arguments not falsifying any preference in MM. However E0 ¼ ; which means that MM is
inconsistent.
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hA;R; V ; arg;MMi to a preference-based argumentation framework hA;R;i with ¼ ðE0Þ ¼ ðAÞ which
is Dung’s argumentation framework hA;Di with D ¼ R.
Note however that we do not associate ¼ ðE0Þ ¼ ðAÞ tox as soon asx is inconsistent. In some cases,
a more reﬁned total pre-order can be computed when some preferences are not responsible of inconsistency.
We take our inspiration from the algorithm computing the least speciﬁc model of MM.
Example 11 Example 10continued. We consider the argumentation framework given in the previous example
with the following set of preferences MM ¼ fv2 MM v1; v3 MM v4; v5 MM v6g.
We have E0 ¼ fA6;A7g. We remove v2 MM v1. The remaining preferences are inconsistent. So ¼ ðE0;E1Þ
with E0 ¼ fA6;A7g and E1 ¼A n E0.
Algorithm 3 gives a total pre-order associated with an inconsistent set of preferences MM. Algorithm 2
can also be extended to treat inconsistent preferences by adding El ¼A to If box.
Algorithm 3. A total pre-order associated with MM.
Data: hA;R; V ; arg;MMi, MM ¼ fvi MM vjg.
Result: ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ.beginl = 0
while A 6¼ ; do
El ¼ fB : B 2A; 8vi MM vj;B 62 argðvjÞg
if El ¼ ; then
inconsistent preferences,
El ¼A
A ¼A n El
l ¼ lþ 1
return ¼ ðE0; . . . ;El	1Þ
endAs we already said, once  is computed, hA;R; V ; arg;xi is reduced to hA;R;i. Of course we cannot
say that hA;R; V ; arg;xi represents hA;R;i since x is inconsistent and  does not satisfy all prefer-
ences ofx. In the best case  is composed of more than one equivalence class, in which case it satisﬁes some
preferences ofx. Such a way to treat inconsistent preferences is in accordance with our basic idea, namely to
use a speciﬁcity principle. Clearly one can imagine other ways to tackle this problem as suggested by the fol-
lowing example.
Example 12. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MM i be a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework such that
A ¼ fA1;A2;A3g, V ¼ fv1; v2; v3g with argðv1Þ ¼ fA1;A2g, argðv2Þ ¼ fA1;A3g and argðv3Þ ¼ fA2;A3g. Let
preferences be speciﬁed by MM ¼ fv1 MM v2; v2 MM v3; v1 MM v3g and R be deﬁned by: A1RA3, A2RA3,
A3RA1 and A3RA2 (see Fig. 5).
At ﬁrst sight we may think that preferences of MM are not conﬂicting since we have v1 MM v2 MM v3.
However following our approach, we use minimal speciﬁcity principle to reduce v1 MM v2 MM v3 to a total
pre-order ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ on A. E0 is composed of arguments that do not appear in any right-hand side ofFig. 5. Example 12.
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inconsistent.
We reduce hA;R; V ; arg;MMi to hA;R;i with ¼ ðfA1;A2;A3gÞ. Then A1 and A3 defeat each other, A2
and A3 defeat each other. The grounded extension is empty. Let us now compute preferred extensions. We
have S1 ¼ fA1;A2g and S2 ¼ fA3g. Then we may prefer to accept S1 but not S2 since the former promote v1
while the latter promotes v2 and v3 which are less preferred than v1. However this way (satisfactory and
intuitive in the above value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework) may be debatable in some cases. First we
have to determine which values are promoted by a set of arguments. Does S1 promote v1 only or v1, v2 and v3?
Intuitively we would say v1 only because the whole set S1 is accepted so we should look for values promoted by
all arguments of S1. However comparing sets of arguments on the basis of values they promote may lead to an
extreme situation where each preferred extension promotes an empty set of values; which leads to
incomparable preferred extensions. Moreover as an argument does not necessarily promote a value, this way
to compare preferred extensions cannot be used in our approach.
The above examples suggest that dealing with inconsistent preferences is an interesting issue that should be
further discussed and explored. This is left for further research.
6. Related work
Concerning the extensive work of Amgoud and colleagues on preference-based argumentation theory, our
value-based argumentation theory seems closest to the argumentation framework based on contextual prefer-
ences given in [3]. A context may be an agent, a criterion, a viewpoint, etc., and they are ordered. For example,
in law earlier arguments are preferred to later ones, arguments of a higher authority are preferred to arguments
of a lower authority, more speciﬁc arguments are preferred over more general arguments, and these three rules
are ordered themselves too. However our approach is more general since we compare sets of arguments.
Speciﬁcity principle has been also used in much other work [20–22]. However in that work, the preference
relation over arguments is deﬁned on the basis of speciﬁcity of their internal structure. In our framework spec-
iﬁcity concerns abstract arguments without referring to their internal structure. The use of speciﬁcity principle
in our framework suggests that we have default knowledge about preferences over the arguments and use algo-
rithms to derive the most likely preference order on arguments.7. Summary
We distinguish three kinds of argumentation frameworks in the literature, as far as relevant for the new
theory developed in this paper:
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework is a tuple hA;Di whereA is a ﬁnite set of arguments and D is a
binary defeat relation deﬁned on AA.
Amgoud and Cayrol’s preference-based argumentation framework is a triplet hA;R;i where A is a set of
arguments, R is a binary attack relation deﬁned onAA and  is a (total or partial) pre-order (preference
relation) deﬁned on AA.
Bench-Capon’s value-based argumentation framework is a 5-tuple VAF ¼ hA; R; V ; val;Pi, where A is a
ﬁnite set of arguments,R is an irreﬂexive binary relation onA, V is a non-empty set of values, val is a function
which maps from elements ofA to elements of V and P is the set of possible audiences. An audience speciﬁc
argumentation framework is a tuple VAF a ¼ hA;R; V ; val; >ai, where a 2 P is an audience and >a is a partial
order on V.
Dung’s semantics for argumentation frameworks can be used for preference-based argumentation and
audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks too, using the following relations between the
frameworks:
hA;R;i represents hA;Di if and only if (8A;B 2A, we have ADB if and only if ARB and it is not the case
that B  A), and
hA;R; V ; arg; >ai represents hA;R;i if and only if (8A;B 2A, we have A  B if and only if
valðAÞ>avalðBÞ or valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ).
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framework to represent an argumentation framework. We show that an argumentation framework is repre-
sented by a set of preference-based argumentation frameworks, and that a preference-based argumentation
framework is represented by a set of audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation frameworks, though the latter
are renamings of each other.We show also that these relations holdwhenwe restrict ourselves to total pre-orders.
In this paper we consider a generalization of Bench-Capon’s audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation
framework, in which arguments can promote multiple values, and various kinds of preferences among values
can be expressed. We call our structure a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework. To calculate the pref-
erence-based argumentation theory represented by the value-speciﬁcation framework, we use techniques from
non-monotonic reasoning about preferences.
An audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework is a 5-tuple hA; R; V ; arg; >ai whereA is a set of
arguments, R is an attack relation on AA, V is a set of values, arg is a function from V to 2A such that
argðvÞ is the set of arguments promoting the value v, and >a is a partial order on V.
A value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework is a 5-tuple hA;R; V ; arg;xi where A is a set of argu-
ments, R is an attack relation on AA, V is a set of values, arg is a function from V to 2A, and
x  V  V is a set of preferences over V with x 2 fMM ;mmg.
The problem of reducing ordered values to a preference relation comes down to reducing a preference rela-
tion over sets of arguments to a preference relation over single arguments. To reason about ordered values and
to compute the preference relation over arguments, we are inspired by insights from the non-monotonic logic
of preference known as minimal speciﬁcity, System Z, gravitation to normality, and otherwise, and we use
both so-called optimistic and pessimistic ways to deﬁne the preference relation.
hA;R; V ; arg;xi represents hA;R;i if and only if x ¼ MM (x ¼ mm) and  is the least (most) speciﬁc
relation among the 0 such that hA;R;0i satisﬁes hA;R; V ; arg;xi, where hA;R;i satisﬁes
hA;R; V ; arg;xi if and only if  satisﬁes each vi x vj in x.
We have that a preference-based argumentation framework can be represented by several value-speciﬁca-
tion frameworks, but in this case we do not have that the value-speciﬁcation frameworks are renamings of
each other. This illustrates one aspect in which our way of reasoning with values is distinct from the way val-
ues are treated in Bench-Capon’s framework.
The set of acceptable arguments can be calculated by combining algorithms from non-monotonic reasoning
with algorithms for calculating extensions in argumentation theory. We introduce an algorithm for Dung’s
grounded semantics. It shows that the computation of the set of acceptable arguments can be combined with
the optimistic reasoning to incrementally deﬁne the set of acceptable arguments, because in this construction
for each equivalence class we can deduce which arguments are not attacked by other arguments. This property
does not hold for pessimistic reasoning.
The present work can be extended in various ways, for example:
• The elicitation of preference speciﬁcation x. For example, Bench-Capon et al. [6] deﬁne an ordering on
values through a dialogue between two players. The basic item in this dialogue are arguments that an agent
likes to see accepted and others to be rejected,
• To study the case where both maxmax and minmin preferences are provided at the same time i.e.
MM [mm. A possible solution would be to compute acceptable arguments with respect to MM and
mm given individually and then use the notions of objective and subjective acceptance as in [5],
• To study the reinforcement among diﬀerent arguments promoting the same value [5],
• A theory of value-based extension of Bochman’s generalization of Dung’s theory called collective argumen-
tation [11], where the attack relation is deﬁned over sets of arguments instead of single arguments. It seems
natural to develop a uniﬁed framework where both attack and preference relations are deﬁned over sets of
arguments.
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framework hA;Di it represents. By construction.
For each argumentation framework hA;Di there is a preference-based argumentation framework
hA;R;i that represents it. Take R ¼ D and  is the universal relation.
Proof of Lemma 2. If hA;R;i represents hA;D1i and hA;D2i, then D1 ¼ D2. By construction.
Proof of Theorem 1. Follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. For each audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework there is a preference-
based argumentation framework it represents. By construction. For each preference-based argumentation
framework hA;R;i there is an audience speciﬁc value-based argumentation framework hA;R; V ; val; >ai
that represents it. Assume a unique value for each equivalence class of  , and let valðAÞ be this unique value
for argument A. Then valðAÞ>avalðBÞ if A  B and valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ if A ’ B.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that hA;R; V ; val; >ai represents hA;R;1i and hA;R;2i. By deﬁnition this
means that (8A;B 2A, we have A1B iﬀ valðAÞ>avalðBÞ or valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ) and (8A;B 2A, we have
A2B iﬀ valðAÞ>avalðBÞ or valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ). Indeed 8A;B 2A we have A1B iﬀ valðAÞ>avalðBÞ or
valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ iﬀ A2B. Indeed 1 ¼ 2 since 1 and 2 are deﬁned in the same way.
Suppose that hA;R; V 1; val1; >a;1i and hA;R; V 2; val2; >a;2i represent hA;R;i. Bydeﬁnition the ﬁrst hypo-
thesis means that 8A;B2A we have AB iﬀ val1ðAÞ>a;1val1ðBÞ or val1ðAÞ¼ val1ðBÞ (*). Also hA;R;V 2;val2;
>a;2i represents hA;R;i means that 8A;B2A we have AB iﬀ val2ðAÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ or val2ðAÞ¼ val2ðBÞ (**).
(1) Suppose that val1ðAÞ ¼ val1ðBÞ. Following hypothesis (*) this means that A  B. Moreover, following
hypothesis (**) we have ðval2ðAÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ or val2ðAÞ ¼ val2ðBÞ). Now val1ðAÞ ¼ val1ðBÞ also implies
val1ðBÞ ¼ val1ðAÞ due to symmetry. Then we have B  A following hypothesis (*). Following hypothesis
(**) we also have (val2ðBÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ or val2ðBÞ ¼ val2ðAÞ). Indeed we have val2ðAÞ ¼ val2ðBÞ. Similar
reasoning when val2ðAÞ ¼ val2ðBÞ.
(2) Suppose that val1ðAÞ>a;1val1ðBÞ. This means that A  B following hypothesis (*). A  B is equivalent to
val2ðAÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ or val2ðAÞ ¼ val2ðBÞ following hypothesis (**). Suppose that we have val2ðAÞ ¼
val2ðBÞ. This implies val2ðBÞ ¼ val2ðAÞ. Then we have B  A following hypothesis (**) which is equivalent
to val1ðBÞ>a;1val1ðAÞ or val1ðAÞ ¼ val1ðBÞ. Contradiction. Similar reasoning when val2ðAÞ>a;2val2ðBÞ.Proof of Theorem 2. Follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Proof of Theorem 3. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let v1 mM v2 be a minmax preference and  be a total pre-order on A such that  sat-
isﬁes v1 mM v2.
Assume that for each argument A there is a value v with argðvÞ ¼ fAg, which we call vA.
(1) Let us ﬁrst prove that  satisﬁes v1 mM v2 if and only if for each A 2 argðv1Þ,  satisﬁes vA MM v2.– ): If  satisﬁes v1 mM v2 then for each A 2 argðv1Þ,  satisﬁes vA MM v2.
Suppose that  satisﬁes v1 mM v2. Following Deﬁnition 13 this means that each argument A in
argðv1Þ is preferred to each argument B in argðv2Þ with respect to  . So the argument A in vA is pre-
ferred to each argument B in argðv2Þ. Since argðvAÞ is composed of A and no other arguments, we have
maxðargðvAÞ;Þ ¼ fAg. Then  satisﬁes vA MM v2.
– (: If for each A 2 argðv1Þ,  satisﬁes vA MM v2 then  satisﬁes v1 mM v2.
Suppose that 8A 2 argðv1Þ. We have that  satisﬁes vA MM v2. Since argðvAÞ is composed of argu-
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vA MM v2 means that for each A in argðv1Þ we have A  B, 8B 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ. So the least pre-
ferred argument in argðv1Þ with respect to  is preferred to B, and we have 8B 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ.
Indeed 8A 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ, 8B 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ we have A  B which is equivalent to state that
 satisﬁes v1 mM v2.(2) We now prove that  satisﬁes v1 mM v2 if and only if for each A 2 argðv2Þ,  satisﬁes v1 mm vA.
): If  satisﬁes v1 mM v2 then 8A 2 argðv2Þ,  satisﬁes v1 mm vA.
Suppose that  satisﬁes v1 mM v2. Following Deﬁnition 13 this means that each argument in argðv1Þ
is preferred to each argument in argðv2Þ with respect to  . Formally 8B 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ,
8A 2 maxðargðv2Þ;Þ we have B  A. Then 8B 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ, 8A 2 minðargðvAÞ;Þ we have
B  A since minðargðvAÞ;Þ ¼ fAg (Recall that argðvAÞ is composed of only one argument namely A).
Indeed  satisﬁes v1 mm vA for each A 2 argðv2Þ.
(: If 8A 2 argðv2Þ,  satisﬁes v1 mm v2 then  satisﬁes v1 mM v2.
Suppose that 8A 2 argðv2Þ,  satisﬁes v1 mm vA. This means that 8B 2 minðargðv1Þ;Þ,
8A 2 minðargðvAÞ;Þ we have B  A. Note that argðvAÞ ¼ fAg so minðargðvAÞ;Þ ¼ fAg. Indeed each
argumentB in argðv1Þ is preferred to each argumentA in argðv2Þwith respect to i.e. satisﬁes v1 mM v2.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof is given by construction from Deﬁnition 10. Given hA;R;i, we associate a
value to each argument in A such that 8A;B 2A, valðAÞ ¼ valðBÞ iﬀ A ’ B. Then we deﬁne >a as follows:
8A;B 2A, we have valðAÞ>avalðBÞ iﬀ A  B.
Proof of Lemma 7. If hA;R; V ; arg;ai represents hA;R;1i and hA;R;2i, then 1 ¼ 2. By
construction.
Proof of Theorem 5. follows directly from Lemmas 6 and 7.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MMi be a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework and
¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ be the least speciﬁc model of MM.
(1) Let A 2 E0. Suppose that 9=B 2 E0 such that BRA. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: there is no C in E1 [   En such that CRA. This means that A is not attacked at all and then not
defeated. So it belongs to the grounded extension.
Case 2: A is attacked by an argument B from E1 [    [ En. This attack does not succeed since A belongs
to E0 so it is strictly preferred to B. Then A is not defeated and should belong to the grounded
extension.(2) Let S1 be a subset of GE. Let A and B be two arguments of E0 such that BRA and A is defended by S1.
Note that S1 is a subset of GE so it is composed of acceptable arguments. Following the deﬁnition of the
grounded extension, each argument defended by acceptable arguments also belongs to GE. So we have
A 2 GE.
(3) Let S2  GE be the minimal subset of E0 computed following items 1 and 2. This means that S2 is com-
posed of arguments in E0 which are not defeated and all arguments of E0 which are defeated but
defended by acceptable arguments. So each argument A of E0 outside S2 is defeated and non-defended
by arguments already put in GE. So A does not belong to GE.Proof of Lemma 9. By deﬁnition of the grounded extension each argument defeated by acceptable arguments
(those already put in the grounded extension) does not belong to GE. So once the subset of GE computed in
the ﬁrst iteration of the algorithm (when computing E0), each argument outside E0 and defeated by GE does
not belong to GE.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let hA;R; V ; arg;MMi be a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework. For each
k 6¼ 0, letA be the set of arguments after iteration k 	 1. Moreover, let R ¼ ðE0 [    [ Ek	1Þ n GE. Note that
R is composed of arguments of E0 [    [ Ek	1 that do not belong to the grounded extension.
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Case 1: A is attacked by an argument in E0 [    [ Ek	1. Since we have that R ¼ E0 [    [ Ek	1 n GE, this
means that A is defeated by an argument in the current GE then it should has been removed from
A in earlier iteration, line 8. Indeed A belongs to GE.
Case 2: A is attacked by an argument in Ekþ1 [    [ En. This attack does not succeed since A is strictly
preferred to its attackers. Then A is not defeated and then belongs to GE.(2) The proof is similar to the one of item 2, Lemma 8. A belongs to GE as soon as it is defended by accept-
able arguments.
(3) The proofs of item (3) and (4) are similar to the ones of item (3) and Lemma 9 respectively.Proof of Theorem 6. By deﬁnition the grounded extension is composed of non-defeated arguments, defeated
arguments but defended by the current grounded extension and so on until we reach a ﬁxpoint. Note that at
each iteration the algorithm puts in GE arguments that are not defeated (line 4). This is stated in item 1 of
Lemmas 8 and 9. So each argument which is not defeated belongs to the grounded extension. Then following
item 2 of Lemmas 8 and 9, at each iteration of the algorithm defeated arguments that are defended by argu-
ments already accepted (i.e. already put in the grounded extension) belong also to the grounded extension.
Following Algorithm 1 this reasoning is repeated until all arguments are treated. Indeed Algorithm 1 com-
putes the grounded extension of hA;R; V ; arg;MMi.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let hA;R; V ; arg;mmi be a value-speciﬁcation argumentation framework and GE be its
grounded extension. Let ¼ ðE0; . . . ;EnÞ be the most speciﬁc pre-order satisfying mm.
(1) Suppose thatA 2 Ek such that 9=B 2AwithBRA. Thismeans thatB is not defeated. Then it belongs toGE.
(2) Suppose that A 2 Ek such that 9B 2A with BRA and 9=C 2A with CRB. This means that A is defeated
and its defeater is not attacked at all. So A is not defended. Then A does not belong to GE.References
[1] L. Amgoud, C. Cayrol, Inferring from inconsistency in preference-based argumentation frameworks, International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning 29 (2) (2002) 125–169.
[2] L. Amgoud, C. Cayrol, D. LeBerre, Comparing arguments using preference orderings for argument-based reasoning, in: Proceedings
of the 8th International Conference on Tools with Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ICTAI’96), 1996, pp. 400–403.
[3] L. Amgoud, S. Parsons, L. Perrussel, An argumentation framework based on contextual preferences, in: Proceedings of the 3rd
International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning (FAPR’00), 2000, pp. 59–67.
[4] K. Atkinson, T. Bench-Capon, P. McBurney, Persuasive political argument, in: Computational Models of Natural Argument,
IJCAI05’s Workshop, 2005, pp. 44–51.
[5] T.J.M. Bench-Capon, Persuasion in practical argument using value-based argumentation frameworks, Journal of Logic and
Computation 13 (3) (2003) 429–448.
[6] T.J.M. Bench-Capon, S. Doutre, P.E. Dunne, Audiences in argumentation frameworks, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 42–71.
[7] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, S. Kaci, H. Prade, Bipolar possibilistic representations, in: Proceedings of the 18th Conference on
Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (UAI’02), 2002, pp. 45–52.
[8] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade, Representing default rules in possibilistic logic, in: Proceedings of 3rd International Conference of
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’92), 1992, pp. 673–684.
[9] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade, Argumentative inference in uncertain and inconsistent knowledge base, in: Proceedings of the 9th
Conference on Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (UAI’93), 1993, pp. 411–419.
[10] S. Benferhat, S. Kaci, A possibilistic logic handling of strong preferences, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Fuzzy Systems
Association (IFSA’01), 2001, pp. 962–967.
[11] A. Bochman, Propositional argumentation and causal reasoning, in: Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI’05), 2005, pp. 388–393.
[12] A. Chorley, T.J.M. Bench-Capon, An empirical investigation of reasoning with legal cases through theory construction and
application, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law 13 (2005) 323–371.
[13] S. Coste, C. Devred, P. Marquis, Symmetric argumentation frameworks, in: Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on
Symbolic and Quantitative to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU’05), 2005, pp. 317–328.
[14] P.M. Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person
games, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 77 (1995) 321–357.
S. Kaci, L. van der Torre / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 730–751 751[15] S. Kaci, L. van der Torre, Algorithms for a nonmonotonic logic of preferences, in: Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on
Symbolic and Quantitative to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU’05), 2005, pp. 281–292.
[16] S. Kaci, L. van der Torre, E. Weydert, Acyclic argumentation: Attack = conﬂict + preference, in: Proceedings of the 17th European
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ECAI’06), 2006, pp. 725–726.
[17] J. Pearl, System Z: A natural ordering of defaults with tractable applications to default reasoning, in: Proceedings of the 3rd
Conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge (TARK’90), 1990, pp. 121–135.
[18] Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980.
[19] H. Prakken, An exercise in formalising teleological case-based reasoning, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law 10 (2001) 113–133.
[20] H. Prakken, G. Sartor, Argument-based extended logic programming with defeasible priorities, Journal of Applied Non-Classical
Logics 7 (1997) 25–75.
[21] G.R. Simari, R.P. Loui, A mathematical treatment of defeasible reasoning and its implementation, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 53 (1992)
125–157.
[22] F. Stolzenburg, A.J. Garcı´a, C.I. Chesn˜evar, G.R. Simari, Computing generalized speciﬁcity, Journal of Applied Non-Classical
Logics 13 (1) (2003) 87–113.
[23] R.R. Yager, Entropy and speciﬁcity in a mathematical theory of evidence, International Journal of General Systems 9 (1983) 249–260.
